A 7 page review of the factors that interplayed in determining the utilization of submarines in World
War II. The author notes the development of the submarine in the U.S. Civil War but contends that it was largely ignored by world powers until
World War II. The Germans distinguished themselves from the U.S. and Britain by a heavy reliance on this technology. Bibliography lists 7
Name of Research Paper File: AM2_PPsubmar.rtf
Unformatted Sample Text from the Research Paper:
This technology and the ideology surrounding its use is particularly interesting in the evolution it experienced between World War I and World War II. The mechanisms of warfare which
were in place between World War I and World War II were the product of an evolution which was practically as lengthy as the evolution of man himself. The
submarine, in comparison, had only made its advent into the naval arsenal during the Civil War period. It would not truly make an impact on an international scale until
World War II. This impact was a dichotomous one, however, when we compare its differing utilization by the major world players and, in particular, by the U.S. and Germany.
The development of the submarine just previous to the turn of the twentieth century is related, of course, to a number of other
critical developments in weaponry which were unveiled during this time. The evolution of projectiles, for example, had just moved weaponry from relying on the so called "round balls", a
spherical and relatively large and heavy shot, towards relying more on rifled projectory which was effective over greater distancesi. While the crushing power of the round balls had no
match in the newly designed projectile typesii, the rapid revolution in this area could be contended to have spawned evolution in other aspects of weaponry such as ship design.
The penetration of this new ammunition most certainly presented a concern in this design as did the extended range at which the ammunition was effective.
Whether we are considering war in the Americas or war in Europe, sea power was of particular importance. Clausewitzian theory had perpetuated the belief that