In six pages this Piper Alpha disaster is analyzed in terms of background and a risk assessment is also presented. Five sources are cited in the bibliography.
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analyses. Several systems on board the platform had failed which included mechanical, communication and safety measures which if operating properly could have lessened the disaster considerably. Since that time, oil
companies, insurance companies, investors and workers have all had to make their own risk assessments in regards to continuation of the production of oil from off-shore platforms.
The July 6, 1988 Piper Alpha oil platform disaster in which 167 people died of the 227 men aboard resulted from a combination of technical
and man-made inefficiencies on the rig. What began as a routine maintenance procedure which could not be completed because of lack of proper equipment led to the removal of a
pressure safety valve in a backup propane pump which was not replaced. Later in the evening, personnel in the control room, not knowing the valve had been removed decided to
use the backup pump which caused the gas to escape with such force that it was described by workers as "screaming like a banshee". At about 10:00, the gas ignited
and then exploded taking half of the platform with it (Conway, Salazar and Byrd, 2002). Certain safety processes failed during the subsequent additional explosions and fire. The explosion blew down
some of the fire walls and soon the stored oil was burning. In addition, the automatic deluge system which was supposed to spray water on fires within the rig had
been turned off (Conway, Salazar and Byrd, 2002). The fire spread quickly to the portion of the platform which contained the gas contained risers which eventually burst and released a
jet of fuel. The remaining crew gathered in the crews quarters which seemed to be the furthest from the blast area but the accommodation area was not smoke proof and