Research Paper on:
Stoessinger on Vietnam

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enigma. How could a backward Third World nation of peasants defeat a great super power and resist the enormity of the American arsenal? Stoessinger provides an answer that is drawn  from the historical record and how each of five American presidents grossly misunderstood the way in which the Vietnamese people perceived this conflict. He proposes that part of why the  U.S. lost in Vietnam was due to the "power of the weak" (Stoessinger 101). By this, Stoessinger is referring to the fact that as time progressed Ho Chi Minh  had "progressively less to lose by continuing to fight, while the stakes grew more costly for his American opponent" (Stoessinger 101). Johnson was attempting to overpower the North Vietnamese through  the use of force, compelling the enemy to surrender by increased bombing, increased casualties and destruction of the civilian population. What Johnson did not realize was the fatalism of  a people who would choose to be bombed "into the Stone Age," rather than capitulate (Stoessinger 101). Henry Kissinger, who was Secretary of State during the final years of the  war, verifies that there was never any thought of compromise for North Vietnamese leaders, as "Hanoi leaders had launched their war in order to win, not to cut a deal"  (Kissinger 684). Rather than commit virtual genocide and lose the "soul of the United States," Johnson was finally forced to withdraw American forces from Vietnam, which meant that "Ho Chi  Minhs strategy of weakness prevailed over Johnsons strategy of strength" (Stoessinger 101). In his discussion of the history of the war and the American administrations leading up to that  of Lyndon Johnson, Stoessinger develops another prevalent theme, which explains the motivation of the Vietnamese people and why they chose to face alienation if necessary in order to drive out