Research Paper on:
Thomas Nagel's 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?

Unformatted Sample Text from the Research Paper:
Like to Be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel (1974) takes reductionists to task for attempting to clarify the mind-body connection within the reductionist framework alone. Reductionism seeks to explain the  connection - if it exists - in the same objective manner that scientists explain inanimate matter. Nagel (1974) argues that consciousness is not objective, that it requires a frame  of reference and some kind of experiential perspective in order to effect definition. That, in turn, requires a measure of imagination, which introduces yet another subjective component as well.  The reductionist who insists on complete objectivity can recognize only part of the relationship that exists. If the reductionist is able to arrive at some reasonable statement, it  will be incomplete. Conscious Experience The usual examples used to explain the mind-body relationship in the reductionist view have been inadequate in  that those attempts have refused to acknowledge any possibility of a requirement of subjectivity. Nagel (1974) notes that "Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting.  With consciousness it seems hopeless ... careful examination will show that no currently available concept of reduction is applicable" (p. 534). Most agree  that conscious experience is common at many levels of animal life, and Nagel (1974) uses the assumption that non-human animal forms have conscious experience in naming this work. He  states that the fact that an organism has any form of conscious experience equates to the fact that there are aspects of those conscious experiences that combine to define what  it is like to be that organism, thus the title of the work. Idle questions of "What do dogs dream?" or "Is the movement of the cats tail really