Research Paper on:
A Review of Two Faces of Intention by Michael Bratman

Unformatted Sample Text from the Research Paper:
Faces of Intention," author Michael Bratman discusses from the philosophical perspective the connection between (1) intending to act and (2) acting with intention. Though this seems to be a  matter of semantics and psychological process, philosophy takes a different view. Bratman (1984) explains that philosophically, having an intention to act commonly is accepted as being inextricably linked to  also holding a belief, desire or both regarding the intended action. It is Bratmans (1984) purpose to take exception to the commonly accepted  position. He refers to a term that many philosophers avoid: common sense. He argues that though the desire-belief model can aptly describe many situations of intent and  intentional action, it cannot describe all that can be conceived. Failure of the Desire-Belief Model Bratman (1984) writes that he may intend to  start his car, and the action of doing so requires that he intentionally act to achieve that end. These examples do support the desire-belief model, in that he both  desires to start his car and believes that he will do so. The intentional act of doing so supports both the desire and belief.  There are many easily-identifiable situations in which an individual may have intention to act but cannot follow through with the intentional action. Bratman (1984) uses the example  of playing a video game in which the object is to hit a target. He may intend to hit the target because that is the goal of the game,  but he may fail to hit the target through no failure of his intention to do so. Similarly, a busy mother may intend