Research Paper on:
Interwar Years and Gold Standard Failure

Unformatted Sample Text from the Research Paper:
which inevitably paved the way for the Great Depression. That the Bretton Woods system provided for the adjustable-peg exchange-rate to uphold an indirect connection with gold did not influence  its eventual failure due to "inadequate policy tools and theory" (Bordo, no date), a lethal combination that would at last be instrumental in creating managed float and the 1970s Great  Inflation. This failure would serve as important lessons in post-1945 society where the weight was now placed squarely upon achieving low inflation and "convertibility-rule-like behavior" (Bordo, no date).  "The pre-1914 Gold Standard lasted as long as it did because it was embedded in the moral conscience of Victorian England. It was a cultural symbol - as good as  gold - as well as a financial policy. Those who understood how it worked thought it would be a sin to go off gold, and those who didnt thought it  would be literally impossible" (OSullivan, 1997, p. 56). The gold standard, while seemingly beneficial at its origin, was contingent as a rule, inasmuch as something as economically impacting as  war could readily permit authorities to "temporarily suspend convertibility, issue fiat money to finance their expenditures, and sell debt" (Bordo, no date), to then be repaid in gold or undepreciated  paper. Such countries as France, the UK and the US took to the gold standard contingent rule with good result, inasmuch as being a core country loaned itself to  success. Smaller Western European and British Dominion countries were able to work with the system, as well, however, Latin American and Southern/Eastern European outlying countries did not fare well  at all due to "frequent suspensions of convertibility and devaluations" (Bordo, no date). The fundamental performance that was the gold standard could be distinctively determined country by country via